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ABSTRACT 
A wealth of scholarship examines the reasons Supreme Court 
Justices retire.  While political scientists and legal scholars have analyzed 
the political and personal factors that play a role in retirements with 
varying conclusions, little has been written about the judicial careers of 
senior justices.  This study compares the careers of the eleven senior 
justices who have sat by designation on the federal circuit courts.  The 
senior justices are compared with each other as well as with active justices, 
with active circuit judges, and with senior circuit judges.  The goal of this 
essay is to increase our understanding of senior service. 
This essay hypothesizes that senior justices will be deferred to more 
often while sitting on a circuit panel and that they will have some extra 
insight into the Supreme Court’s reasoning or cares as a result of their 
active service.  The data, however, does not support these hypotheses. 
Rather more modest and partial answers seem to explain the results. 
Analyzing a variety of factors, including the instances where each 
justice sat in a majority, wrote the opinion, or was overturned by the 
Supreme Court, this study finds that senior justices are not unique in their 
application of the law.  Although their prior service on the Supreme Court 
likely provides these senior justices with additional insight into the Court’s 
dynamics, they seem unable to translate that insight in order to persuade 
their former colleagues or arrive at the correct decision in the first instance 
any more often than other circuit judges. 
Senior justices are equally as likely as circuit judges to be overturned 
by the Supreme Court.  They produce far fewer opinions, concurrences, 
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and dissents than active Supreme Court Justices, active circuit judges, and 
even senior circuit judges, although this latter group has the most parallels 
with senior justices.  The only category in which senior justices surpass 
their former Supreme Court colleagues and senior circuit judges is the 
likelihood that they will author an opinion.  This essay posits that the 
results it finds are products of the senior justices’ seniority and reduced 
workload on appellate panels, among other variables.  Further research and 
examination are needed to determine if alternative factors account for this 
essay’s other findings. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1937 justices became eligible to retire from the Supreme Court 
and sit by designation on lower courts.  Eleven out of the thirty-eight 
eligible justices have done so.1  This essay examines and compares their 
service as senior justices on the United States Courts of Appeals in order 
to shed light upon the significant judicial work senior justices undertake. 
Most scholarship on the retirement of Supreme Court justices 
examines the timing, politics, and impact of life tenure upon the justices’ 
decisions to leave the bench.2  Only one study, an article by Minor Myers 
III, briefly examines the careers of retired Supreme Court justices up and 
until Justice White.3  This study updates Myers’ work and expands upon 
it, analyzing and comparing the senior tenures of justices after they leave 
the Supreme Court to increase our understanding of senior service. 
Many differences emerge between the service of active and senior 
Supreme Court Justices.  Similar differences exist between active and 
senior circuit judges, on one hand, and senior justices, on the other.  This 
essay catalogs these differences, as well as the similarities, and draws 
conclusions from the data, investigating the unique properties of the senior 
service of Supreme Court justices.  This study offers an opening salvo in 
a field where almost no research exists, presenting data and analyses to 
quantify the senior careers of Supreme Court justices. 
This essay proceeds in four parts.  Part I provides a statutory and 
judicial history of senior service.  Part II offers the hypotheses that drove 
this study.  Part III covers the essay’s methodology and presents the data 
                                                                                                                         
 1 See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (May 9, 2015, 7:44PM). This 
tally does not include today’s active members of the Court. 
 2 See, e.g., DAVID N. ATKINSON, LEAVING THE BENCH: SUPREME COURT JUSTICES AT 
THE END (1999) (studying why and when justices leave the Court); ARTEMUS WARD, 
DECIDING TO LEAVE: THE POLITICS OF RETIREMENT FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT (2003) (examining the political factors influencing retirement from the Court). 
 3 Minor Myers III, The Judicial Service of Retired United States Supreme Court 
Justices, 32 J. SUP. CT. HISTORY 46 (2007). 
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analyses and observations.  Part IV explains the findings, while the 
conclusion presents considered thoughts and queries for the future. 
I. HISTORY OF RETIRED JUSTICES 
The year 1937 redefined retirement for Supreme Court justices.  
Before that year, justices could resign their commission from the bench 
but not take senior status.4  The passage of the Retirement Act of 1937 
changed this legal landscape, permitting justices to assume senior status 
for the first time.5  While senior justices no longer hear cases on the 
Supreme Court,6 they are eligible to, and frequently do, sit on Courts of 
Appeals by designation.  This section provides a history of the provisions 
enabling justices to leave the Court, assume senior status, and sit by 
designation on lower courts.  It also offers a description of the judicial 
service of these senior justices on the Courts of Appeals. 
A. Retiring from the Supreme Court 
Following the failure of President Franklin Roosevelt’s Court-
packing plan, Congress passed the Retirement Act of 1937.7  Before the 
passage of this Act, justices had far fewer options when leaving the Court.  
After the Act’s passage, justices could take senior status and continue to 
hear and decide cases on lower federal courts.  Since this reform, thirty-
eight justices have left the Court with eleven assuming senior status and 
hearing cases on lower federal courts.8  This practice is commonly, 
although incorrectly, referred to as retiring from the Supreme Court. 
                                                                                                                         
 4 Lisa T. McElroy & Michael C. Dorf, Coming off the Bench: Legal and Policy 
Implications of Proposals to Allow Retired Justices to Sit by Designation on the Supreme 
Court, 61 DUKE L. J. 81, 85 note 13 (2011). 
 5 Matthew Madden, Anticipated Judicial Vacancies and the Power to Nominate, 93 
VA. L. REV. 1135, 1156–57 (2007). 
 6 For articles on the justices’ decisions to retire, see, e.g., Kelly J. Baker, Senior 
Judges: Valuable Resources, Partisan Strategists, or Self-Interest Maximizers?, 16 J.L. & 
POL. 139 (2000) (examining the political implications of senior status); Saul Brenner, The 
Myth that Justices Strategically Retire, 36 THE SOC. SCI. J. 431 (1999) (concluding that 
judges do not retire for political reasons); Terri Peretti & Alan Rozzi, Modern Departures 
from the United States Supreme Court: Party, Pensions, or Power?, 30 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 
131 (2011-12) (analyzing why justices in the modern era have left the Court); Peverill 
Squire, Politics and Personal Factors in Retirement from the United States Supreme Court, 
10 POL. BEHAV. 180 (1988) (finding that pension benefits and infirmities are the two 
strongest predictions of retirement and that activity on the bench, such as opinion writing, 
portends continued service). 
 7 Madden, supra note 5, at 1155. 
 8 Myers, supra note 3, at 46.(describing 35 justices to have left the Court but not 
counting Justices O’Connor, Souter, or Stevens). 
2015] Semi-Retirement of Senior Supreme Court Justices 289 
Before 1869, Supreme Court justices could only leave the Court by 
death or resignation.9  Indeed, from 1801 to 1868, of the twenty-four 
justices who left the bench, four resigned and twenty died.10  Hoping to 
spur older justices to leave the Court before infirmity struck, Congress 
passed The Judiciary Act of 1869, enabling justices to retire from the 
Bench.11  The Act’s “retirement provision had mixed success in enticing 
justices to relinquish their seats on the Supreme Court.”12 
Fifty years later, Congress created the framework for today’s senior 
justices.  First, Congress enabled lower Article III judges to assume senior 
status,13 and, in 1937, Congress enacted similar provisions for justices, 
permitting each to assume senior status while retaining his or her Article 
III commission.14  The Retirement Act of 1954 followed, permitting judges 
aged sixty-five with fifteen years of judicial service to retire.15  Thirty 
years later in 1984 Congress adopted the Rule of Eighty, which permits 
judges to retire on a sliding scale of age and service; those who serve at 
least ten to fifteen years and are between sixty-five and seventy years old 
may retire, provided their age and years of service total eighty.16  Five 
years later in 1989, Congress required that senior judges certify that they 
have completed at least a quarter of their regular workloads in order to 
receive the same salary increases of active Article III judges, and since 
1996, Congress permitted extra work from previous years to carry-over to 
satisfy certification for any single year.17  Since the 1954 Act, every 
member of the Supreme Court has retired or resigned with the exception 
of Chief Justice Rehnquist.18 
Today, this statutory system, cobbled together over 150 years, offers 
a variety of choices for justices preparing to leave fulltime Article III 
service.  Upon reaching the Rule of Eighty, a justice may retire from 
judicial service entirely.  This is the “retirement on salary” option.19  
Retired justices receive an annual pension equivalent to their salary during 
                                                                                                                         
 9 Madden, supra note 5, at 1156. 
 10 Madden, supra note 5, at 1155. 
 11 Madden, supra note 5, at 1156. 
 12 Madden, supra note 5, at 1156 
 13 Mary L. Clark, Judicial Retirement and Return to Practice, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 
841, 862 (2011). 
 14 Madden, supra note 5, at 1157. 
 15 Madden, supra note 5, at 1157. 
 16 Albert Yoon, As You Like It: Senior Federal Judges and the Political Economy of 
Judicial Tenure, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 495, 514 (2005); Clark, supra note 13, at 
863. 
 17 Madden, supra note 5, at 1157 n.79. 
 18 Madden, supra note 5, at 1158. 
 19 Clark, supra note 13, at 863; David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior Judges 
Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 453, 460 (2006-07). 
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their last year of judicial service and may return to law practice or other 
gainful work.20  On the other hand, a justice may assume senior status; 
continue to hear cases; and receive the same salary as if in active service, 
including regular pay increases.21  Taking senior status does not allow a 
senior justice to practice law, but it does create a vacancy, which the 
president and Senate may fill via nomination and confirmation.22 
In order to remain eligible for salary increases and serve by 
designation, the Chief Justice of the United States must designate and 
assign senior justices, and those senior justices must  satisfy a minimum 
workload requirement.23  Because the Chief Justice must assign a senior 
justice to a Circuit Court, he or she has the power to prevent a senior 
colleague from sitting on a lower panel by not designating the justice to 
serve on a particular—or any—court of appeals.  For example, Chief 
Justice Earl Warren refused to designate and assign senior Justice Charles 
Whittaker to hear cases on lower courts, telling a colleague, “Tell [Justice 
Whittaker] that I never could get him to make up his mind, and I’ll be 
damned if I will let him do that to me again trying cases.  So the answer is 
no.”24  Another option to fulfill the senior status obligations with non-
judicial work would enable other justices so prevented still to satisfy their 
statutory obligations and qualify for a pay raise. 
To satisfy the workload requirement, senior justices “must annually 
perform at least the same amount of work that an active judge would 
perform in three months, or other work for the courts as specified in detail 
under the statutory scheme.”25  The other work specified in the statutory 
scheme permits justices to perform non-judicial duties to satisfy their 
obligations. Senior judges must work “equal to the full-time work of an 
employee of the judicial branch,” can do so through non-judicial work, 
and may combine courtroom and non-courtroom duties to meet the 
statutory minimums.26  Thus senior justices enjoy extreme flexibility 
regarding the work they perform to satisfy their statutory obligations.  
Recent examples include Justice O’Connor’s service on the Iraq Study 
Group27 and Chief Justice Burger’s time as chairman of the commission 
planning the bicentennial celebration of the United States Constitution.28  
Despite this broad understanding of service during senior status, justices 
                                                                                                                         
 20 Clark, supra note 13, at 863. 
 21 Clark, supra note 13, at 863. 
 22 Clark, supra note 13, at 863. 
 23 Stras & Scott, supra note 19, at 461. 
 24 Stras & Scott, supra note 19, at 483. 
 25 McElroy & Dorf, supra note 4, at 87 n.25. 
 26 Stras & Scott, supra note 19, at 462. 
 27 McElroy & Dorf, supra note 4, at 114. 
 28 Stras & Scott, supra note 19, at 500 n.332. 
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may not return to sit on the Supreme Court, as the statute does not permit 
the designation and assignment of senior justices to the Supreme Court.29  
Senior justices, therefore, do not vote on certiorari petitions, hear oral 
arguments, or, it seems, eat regularly with the active justices.30 
Senior justices, as a perk of their status, may maintain offices 
anywhere in the country.  Justice O’Connor has chambers in the Supreme 
Court—the first senior justice to do so since Justices Brennan and 
Powell.31  Others kept chambers in the Thurgood Marshall Federal 
Judiciary Building near Union Station in Washington, D.C.32  Justice 
White remained in this building until 2001, when he moved to Denver and 
used that courthouse’s office of the Circuit Justice.33  Today, Justice Souter 
has chambers in New Hampshire.34  Senior justices therefore can and do 
leave Washington and the Supreme Court building.  Despite being able to 
maintain chambers wherever they choose, senior justices are permitted 
only a single clerk for a given year,35 three fewer than their usual allotment 
but commensurate with their reduced workloads.  Table 1 below 
summarizes the employment differences between active, senior, and 
retired judges and justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
 29 Stras & Scott, supra note 19, at 513. There have been recent calls for senior justices 
to sit by designation on the Supreme Court to replace a recused Justice. See, e.g., Lisa T. 
McElroy & Michael C. Dorf, supra note 4; Rebekah Saidman-Krauss, A Second Sitting: 
Assessing the Constitutionality and Desirability of Allowing Retired Supreme Court 
Justices to Fill Recusal-based Vacancies on the Bench, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 253 (2011). 
Despite this statutory disability, Justice Douglas attempted to sit on the Court after his 
retirement and even drafted and printed an opinion in Buckley v. Valeo following Justice 
Stevens’ confirmation as his replacement. Myers, supra note 3, at 56. 
 30 David R. Stras, The Incentives Approach to Judicial Retirement, 90 MINN. L. REV. 
1417, 1438 (2006). 
 31 David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Retaining Life Tenure: The Case for a “Golden 
Parachute,” 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1397, 1465 n.391 (2005). 
 32 Stras & Scott, supra note 31, at 1465. 
 33 Myers, supra note 3, at 56. 
 34 Tony Mauro, Souter Returns to the Granite State, NAT’L L. J. (Aug. 17, 2009), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/scm/PubArticleSCM.jsp?id=1202433117459. 
 35 Stras, supra note 30, at 1445 n.155. 
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   Article III Judges 
Active 
Status 
Senior 
Status Retirement 
Non-diminishing 
Compensation ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Creation of Judicial 
Vacancy ✗ ✓ ✓ 
Subsequent Increases in 
Compensation ✓ ✓ ✗ 
Exemption from Federal 
Taxes on Annual 
Compensation 
✗ ✓ ✓ 
Freedom to Earn Non-
judicial Income ✗ ✗ ✓ 
Judicial Chambers, Clerks, 
& Administrative Support ✓ ✓ ✗ 
Discretion Regarding 
Caseload Number, Type, & 
Calendar 
✗ ✓ N/A 
Participation in Court 
Governance, En Banc 
Decisions 
✓ ✗ ✗ 
 
Table 1: The Differences between Active, Senior, and Retired 
Article III Judicial Service36 
 
B. Sitting By Designation 
Of the thirty-eight justices to retire from the Bench, eleven have 
served on lower courts by designation.  Justice Van Devanter was the first 
to do so, assuming senior status soon after the Retirement Act’s 1937 
passage, although he only oversaw two trials on the Southern District of 
New York while on senior status.37  Justice Souter is the most recent 
Justice to assume senior status and sit by designation, hearing cases on the 
                                                                                                                         
 36 Yoon, supra note 16, at 511. 
 37 See United States v. Graham, 102 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1939); United States v. Moore, 
101 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 664 (1939). 
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First Circuit exclusively.38  Justice Stevens, the most recent justice to retire 
from the Bench, has yet to hear a case on a lower court.39  This section 
covers the history of the eleven justices who heard cases by designation, 
offering a brief portrait of their senior service on the  District and Appellate 
Courts of the United States. 
1. Justice Willis Van Devanter 
As mentioned, Justice Van Devanter, after assuming senior status, 
served as a trial judge in New York.  He heard two cases, one in January 
and another in February of 1938.40  The Second Circuit confirmed his 
power to preside over the case as a senior justice in United States v. 
Moore.41  Justice Van Devanter, however, sat on no appellate panels and 
would die in 1941.42  Given that he never sat on a panel of the United 
States Court of Appeals, Justice Van Devanter’s brief service as a District 
Judge will not inform this essay’s analysis of retired justices’ appellate 
service. 
2. Justice Stanley F. Reed 
Justice Reed had a very prolific career as a senior justice, sitting 
exclusively in Washington, D.C.  He sat on panels for the D.C. Circuit and 
the Court of Claims, the appellate division of which was later folded into 
the Federal Circuit, and served as a Special Master for the Supreme 
Court.43  Justice Reed heard cases for thirteen years, from his assumption 
of senior status in 1957 until 1970.44  When he died ten years later,45 he 
had heard 191 cases, authored 33 opinions, and composed 10 dissents 
during his senior service.46 
                                                                                                                         
 38 See, e.g., United States v. Christi, 682 F.3d 138 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 39 Justice Stevens has, however, published two books: (1) JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE 
CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT MEMOIR (1st ed. 2011) and (2) JOHN PAUL STEVENS, SIX 
AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE SHOULD CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION (1st ed. 2014). 
 40 Myers, supra note 3, at 49. 
 41 101 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1939). 
 42 Willis Van Devanter, THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY, http://www.s
upremecourthistory.org/history-of-the-court/associate-justices/willis-van-devanter-1911-
1937/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2013). 
 43 Myers, supra note 3, at 50. 
 44 Myers, supra note 3, at 50. 
 45 Myers, supra note 3, at 50. 
 46 See, e.g., Brandenfels v. Day, 316 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Atchison, Topekand 
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 156 Ct. Cl. 18, 20 (1962); Johnson v. Geffen, 294 F.2d 
197 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Reed, J., dissenting). 
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3. Justice Harold H. Burton 
Justice Burton, like Justice Reed, remained in Washington, D.C. for 
his entire senior career.  He sat exclusively on the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals, and in the three and a half years he served on that court,47 he 
heard sixty-three cases, wrote eight opinions, concurred once, and 
dissented three times.48  Two years after his last sitting, Justice Burton died 
in October 1964.49 
4. Justice Tom C. Clark 
Justice Clark served as a senior justice for ten years,50 and in that 
time heard 397 cases. He heard three cases as a district judge and was twice 
reversed by the Ninth Circuit.51  As a panel member for the Eighth Circuit, 
however, he later wrote an opinion disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit’s 
opinion that reversed his district court decision, thereby creating a Circuit 
split.52  In resolving the circuit split, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth 
Circuit and adopted the rationales Justice Clark’s used in his Eighth Circuit 
opinion, vindicating his decisions at the trial and appellate level.53  In all, 
he would sit on each Court of Appeals that existed at that time, including 
the United State Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the Federal 
Circuit’s forerunner, and write 72 opinions and two dissents as a senior 
justice.54 
                                                                                                                         
 47 Myers, supra note 3, at 51. 
 48 See, e.g., Stevan v. Union Trust Co. of D.C., 316 F.2d 687, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1963) 
(Burton, J., concurring); Campbell v. United States, 289 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Lord 
v. Lencshire House, Ltd., 272 F.2d 557, 561 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (Burton, J., dissenting). 
 49 Harold H. Burton, THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY, http://www.
supremecourthistory.org/history-of-the-court/associate-justices/willis-van-devanter-1911-
1937/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2013). 
 50 Myers, supra note 3, at 48. 
 51 Myers, supra note 3, at 53. 
 52 Myers, supra note 3, at 54. 
 53 Myers, supra note 3, at 54. 
 54 See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. U. S., 552 F.2d 302, 303 (9th Cir. 
1977); Kadar Corp. v. Milbury, 549 F.2d 230, 232 (1st Cir. 1977); Am. Intern. Trading Co. 
v. Bagley, 536 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1976); Kirby v. Blackledge, 530 F.2d 583, 584 (4th Cir. 
1976); Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 539 F.2d 929, 930 (3d Cir. 1976); 
United States v. Martinez, 538 F.2d 921, 922 (2d Cir. 1976); Heber Val. Milk Co. v. Butz, 
503 F.2d 96, 97 (10th Cir. 1974); Reyes v. Sec’y of Health, Ed. & Welfare, 476 F.2d 910, 
911 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Driscoll v. Nw. Nat. Bank of St. Paul, 484 F.2d 173, 174 (8th Cir. 
1973); Alpha Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 463 F.2d 1098, 1099 (C.C.P.A. 1972); 
J. A. Jones Const. Co. v. Englert Eng’g Co., 438 F.2d 3, 4 (6th Cir. 1971). 
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5. Justice Potter Stewart 
Justice Stewart served as a senior justice for nearly four and a half 
years, although he only heard cases from 1982 to 1984.55  In those two 
years, he sat on the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, hearing 
forty-four cases and writing nine opinions.56  He also dissented twice in 
the same case.57  Later, the Seventh Circuit reheard this case en banc58—
without Justice Stewart—and ruled along Justice Stewart’s line of 
reasoning.  The Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari and reversed 
the Seventh Circuit.59  Justice Stewart’s forceful dissents, thus, came to 
naught. 
6. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Justice Powell left the Supreme Court in the summer of 1987 and 
began hearing cases on senior status that fall.60  He worked exclusively in 
the South, sitting on the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits and maintaining an 
office in the Supreme Court until 1996.61  For four cases, Justice Powell 
heard oral argument but did not participate in their decisions; the 
remaining two judges concurred in the outcome, so no additional action 
was required to render an opinion.62  In total, Justice Powell participated 
in 116 published and 157 unpublished cases, writing 32 published 
opinions, 1 unpublished opinion, and 1 dissent.63  Interestingly, Justice 
Powell participated in far more unpublished dispositions than any other 
senior justice. 
                                                                                                                         
 55 Myers, supra note 3, at 48, 55. 
 56 See, e.g., Nat. Post Office, Mailhandlers, Watchmen Messengers & Group Leaders 
Div., Laborers Intern. Union of North Am., AFL-CIO v. United States Postal Serv., 751 
F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1985); Brine v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 745 F.2d 100 
(1st Cir. 1984); ITT Grinnell Corp. v. Donovan, 744 F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 1984); Stewart v. 
C.I.R., 714 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1983); Owen v. Lash, 682 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 57 Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 706 F.2d 1488 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 58 Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 59 Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985). 
 60 Myers, supra note 3, at 55. 
 61 Id.; see, e.g., Raymond, Colesar, Glapsy & Huss, P.C. v. Allied Capital Corp., 961 
F.2d 489 (4th Cir. 1992); Rice v. Branigar Org., Inc., 922 F.2d 788 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 62 See, e.g., Sargent v. Waters, 71 F.3d 158 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Justice Powell heard oral 
arguments but did not participate in the decision of this case. The decision is filed by a 
quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).”). 
 63 See, e.g., Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Heinsohn, 72 F.3d 126 (4th Cir. 1995); Alexander 
v. Mayor & Council of Town of Cheverly, Md., 953 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1992); Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. v. L. & L. Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1992) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
296 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 11:285 
7. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. 
Justice Brennan assumed senior status in the summer of 1990 after 
suffering a likely stroke.64  Despite living seven more years, Justice 
Brennan would only sit for three cases on the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals.  In those cases, Justice Brennan wrote one opinion, joined a 
unanimous panel in another, and joined a per curiam, unpublished 
opinion.65 
8. Justice Thurgood Marshall 
Justice Marshall had a short senior career.  He assumed senior status 
October 1, 1991 and passed away in late January of 1993.66  In those 
sixteen months, Justice Marshall sat on the Federal Circuit and his old 
court, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.67  On doctor’s orders, Justice 
Marshall canceled a visit to a Baltimore sitting of the Fourth Circuit, which 
senior Justice Powell had arranged.68  In total, Justice Marshall heard eight 
cases, wrote one opinion, and joined seven majorities.69  His service on the 
Federal Circuit resulted in two unpublished dispositions.70 
9. Justice Byron R. White 
Assuming senior status in 1993, Justice White would hear cases on 
Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits over his 
senior judicial career.71  Justice White maintained chambers in the 
Thurgood Marshall Federal Judiciary Building before moving to Denver 
in 2001, although he had stopped hearing cases in 1999.72  In the six years 
he heard arguments, Justice White participated in fifty-one cases, authored 
                                                                                                                         
 64 Myers, supra note 3, at 55; Seth Stern, Inside Brennan’s Post-Retirement Chambers, 
THE JUSTICE BRENNAN BLOG, http://justicebrennan.com/blog/?p=782  (last visited Apr. 8, 
2013). 
 65 See Tenngasco Exch. Corp. v. F.E.R.C., 952 F.2d 535 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Kanuth v. 
Prescott, Ball & Turben, Inc., 949 F.2d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Fenty, 950 
F.2d 797 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (per curiam). 
 66 Myers, supra note 3, at 48. 
 67 See, e.g., Trans Sport, Inc. v. Starter Sportswear, Inc., 964 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1992); 
Doko Farms v. United States, 956 F.2d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 68 Myers, supra note 3, at 55. 
 69 See, e.g., Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1992); 
Morgan v. United States, 968 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 70 Krause v. Dep’t of Air Force, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 27973 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 26, 
1991) (per curiam); Schwarman v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 27973 
(Fed. Cir. Nov. 26, 1991) (per curiam). 
 71 See, e.g., Alpha Epsilon Phi Tau Chapter Hous. Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 114 F.3d 
840 (9th Cir. 1997); Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80 F.3d 289 (8th Cir. 1996); Todd v. AIG 
Life Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 1448 (5th Cir. 1995); Beard v. City of Northglenn, Colo., 24 F.3d 
110 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 72 Myers, supra note 3, at 55–56. 
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eighteen opinions, concurred twice, and dissented once.73  He also 
participated in twenty-three cases that resulted in unpublished opinions.74 
10. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
Since assuming senior status upon the confirmation of her successor 
in 2006, Justice O’Connor has maintained chambers in the Supreme 
Court.75  She has launched a civics education drive76 and sat by designation 
across the nation.  With the exception of the two circuit courts based in 
Washington, D.C.77 Justice O’Connor has served on every Circuit Court 
of Appeals.78  As of December 31, 2014, Justice O’Connor has written 
twenty-two opinions and dissented once out of the eighty-three cases she 
heard that resulted in published opinions.  In addition, Justice O’Connor 
wrote eight unpublished opinions out of a total ninety-three cases she 
heard that were similarly unpublished.79 
11. Justice David H. Souter 
Justice Souter’s retirement has been far more localized than Justice 
O’Connor’s.  Since assuming senior status in 2009, Justice Souter has 
continued to “render substantial judicial service as an Associate Justice,” 
per the terms of his retirement letter, which cited the statutory provisions 
                                                                                                                         
 73 See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 144 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1998) (White, J., 
dissenting); Pulia v. Amoco Oil Co., 72 F.3d 648 (8th Cir. 1995); TBG, Inc. v. Bendis, 36 
F.3d 916 (10th Cir. 1994) (White, J., concurring). 
 74 See, e.g., Allen v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 6693 (9th Cir. Apr. 
8, 19917). 
 75 Myers, supra note 3, at 48. 
 76 See What is iCivics?, ICIVICS, http://www.icivics.org/About (last visited Apr. 8, 
2013). 
 77 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals may dissuade visiting judges and even senior 
justices. See Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1664 (2003) (“[A]bsent a grave emergency, the [D.C. Circuit] 
court will not use visiting judges to decides cases on [its] docket.”). 
 78 See, e.g., Cole v. United States Atty. Gen., 712 F.3d 517 (11th Cir. Mar. 14, 2013); 
In re New Jersey Title Ins. Litig., 683 F.3d 451 (3d Cir. 2012); Lin Xing Jiang v. Holder, 
639 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2011); Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474 (6th Cir. 2010); United States 
v. Cameron, 573 F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Douglas, 569 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 
2009); Biodiversity Conservation Alliance v. Stem, 519 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2008); 
McGill v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 285 F. App’x 765 (1st Cir. 2008); Adelphia Business 
Solutions, Inc. v. Abnos, 482 F.3d 602  (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Rosas, 486 F.3d 
374 (8th Cir. 2007); J & G Sales Ltd. v. Truscott, 473 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 79 See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 354 Fed. Appx. 254 (6th Cir. 2009). One case 
involved a certified Question the Supreme Court of Virginia. It is included in this tally. 
Dunlap v. Cottman Transmissions Sys., LLC, 539 F. App’x 69, 70 (4th Cir. 2013) certified 
question answered sub nom. Dunlap v. Cottman Transmission Sys., LLC, 131318, 2014 
WL 782853 (Va. Feb. 27, 2014). 
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permitting senior service.80  Since 2009, Justice Souter has maintained 
chambers in New Hampshire81 and sat exclusively on the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals, his first federal appointment.  He has heard 193 cases 
with published opinions and 46 more with unpublished opinions.  In these 
few years, he has authored forty published and thirty-five unpublished 
opinions for the Boston-based court.82 
C. Conclusion 
Senior justices work where they will and serve as long as they would 
like or their health permits.  They choose to remain in Washington, D.C. 
or return to the regions where they lived before joining the Supreme Court.  
Their service depends on their health and longevity.  In sum, their senior 
careers are varied. 
Having briefly examined the senior service of the eleven justices to 
assume senior status from the Supreme Court and sit by designation on 
lower courts from an historical perspective, this essay now turns to a 
focused analysis of the judicial work of each. 
II. THEORIES OF SENIOR JUSTICES’ INFLUENCE 
Judging and judges are viewed through many lenses.  To some, 
judging can be a lonely process.83  To others, it can be a collaborative 
process.84  Still others rest decision-making on an informed “hunch.”85  
Acourt can have politically-charged epochs as well as less political eras.86  
Judging can be viewed “attitudinally” or “strategically,”87 and decisions 
can seem blatantly political or technocratically divorced from everyday 
effects.  Whatever matrices ought to be used when studying the judiciary 
to determine what factors influences judges and how judges influence one 
another and the law, are questions scholars have, are, and continue to 
wrestle with and explain.  This essay puts much of that scholarship88 aside 
                                                                                                                         
 80 Letter from David H. Souter to Barack H. Obama, May 1, 2009, available at: 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/DHSLetter.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2013). 
 81 Mauro, supra note 34. 
 82 See, e.g., Feliz v. MacNeill, 493 F. App’x 128 (1st Cir. 2012); EMC Corp. v. Arturi, 
655 F.3d 75 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 83 Patricia Wald, Comment: Some Real-Life Observations About Judging, 26 IND. L. 
REV. 173 (1992). 
 84 Edwards, supra note 77, at 1646. 
 85 J.C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” in 
Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L. Q. 274, 282 (1929). 
 86 Edwards, supra note 77, at 1648. 
 87 Edwards, supra note 77, at 1652. 
 88 Such scholarship includes judicial introspection like the citations above and Judge 
Frank Coffin’s ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING (1994) and THE WAYS OF 
A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL APPELLATE BENCH (1980), as well as political 
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in examining how senior justices perform when sitting by designation on 
circuit courts. 
Instead, this essay looks at the careers of these senior justices and 
asks what distinguishes a senior justice?  Are they essentially “super” 
circuit court judges?  In other words, do they outperform active and senior 
court judges?  Do any senior justices stand out amongst their peers?  What 
anomalies appear in analyzing their careers versus those of active judges?  
Versus senior judges?  Versus active Supreme Court justices?  And Versus 
other senior justices?  The section below posits the most readily apparent 
hypotheses to be expected when undertaking such an examination.  The 
essay then proceeds to present the collected data before analyzing it. 
A. Conventional Wisdoms 
A number of theories and proposals come to mind when studying the 
careers of senior justices.  Are senior justices freed from the weight of the 
Supreme Court and thus more likely to express themselves in a panel 
decision?  Is the necessity to get only one panel member vote for a majority 
produce the justice’s true voice, perhaps as seen in a dissent, compared 
with more compromised majority opinions resulting from the necessity to 
garner four justices to join on the Supreme Court?  Are senior justices 
asked to write more important or mundane opinions as panel members?  
Does the reduction to a single clerk from four lead to fewer opinions? 
These are just a few of the questions that come to mind when 
beginning to investigate the careers of senior justices.  But questions 
specifically about senior justices’ influence on appellate panels and on the 
Supreme Court leap to the forefront. This essay focuses on two 
hypotheses. 
First, it seems that senior justices would command respect among 
circuit judges.  This respect should mean that senior justices wield more 
persuasive power amongst panel members.  Indicators to illustrate this 
hypothesis should include: fewer dissents by senior justices than a typical 
circuit court judge or perhaps a higher percentage of authored panel 
opinions as compared to other circuit judges.  This hypothesis presumes 
collegiality on any given panel,89 and the importance of deliberation.90 
                                                                                                                         
science examinations of the courts too numerous to be cited and hybrids like Frank B. Cross 
& Emerson H. Tiller’s, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: 
Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE. L. J. 2155 (1998). 
 89 For a primer on collegiality and the appellate courts, see Edwards, supra note 77. 
 90 Judge Edwards agrees. Edwards, supra note 77 at 1646 (arguing for collegiality and 
describing the deliberative process on a collegial court as “until a final judgment is reached, 
judges participate as equals in the deliberative process – each judicial voice carries weight, 
because each judge is willing to hear and respond to differing positions. The mutual aim 
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Second, with their unique experience on the High Court, senior 
justices should be better able to anticipate what future courts, most 
importantly the Supreme Court, will do.  These justices, therefore, should 
be reversed less often than typical circuit court judges and be able to signal 
the Court to take notice and follow their lead.  This hypothesis assumes 
that senior justices understand the shifts in the law that may result from 
their departure from active service on the Court and can predict, account 
for, and neutralize those changes91 in their appellate opinions. 
III. OBSERVATIONS: SERVICE ON THE LOWER COURTS 
When retired justices sit on circuit courts, they serve on regular three-
member panels.  It is possible to compare the justices against each other 
as well as active and senior circuit judges by analyzing the outcomes of 
the decisions and the justices’ respective positions in each case.  Part III 
proceeds in two sections.  First, it presents this essay’s methodology.  
Second, it examines the data of the senior justices’ service, comparing 
their service against one another as well as representative active and senior 
court of appeals judges by measuring the instances when justices were in 
the majority, authored the opinion, concurred, dissented, were appealed 
and granted certiorari, and were reversed or affirmed by the Supreme 
Court.  It also compares and analyzes the data presented and explores 
trends, outliers, and curiosities. 
This section finds that senior justices have unique service records and 
stand apart from their former peers and those judges who share panels with 
them.  It also demonstrates that senior justices possess no additional or 
unique insight, as compared with their fellow appellate court judges, into 
the future actions of the Supreme Court, a result contrary to the natural 
assumption that they would possess this insight. 
A. Methodology 
Comprehensive database searches produced the dataset used in this 
research.  Every case a senior justice participated in was catalogued, as 
were   the cases’ procedural postures and the justice’s position on each 
panel.  This procedure produced a complete dataset from which to base 
observations, analyses, and comparisons. 
                                                                                                                         
of the judges is to apply the law and find the right answer.”). Judge Posner disagrees. See 
RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008) (“Judicial deliberation is overrated.”). 
 91 Judge Posner described the dangers of those changes when accounting for the 
Supreme Court’s shift following the departure of Justice O’Connor and the arrival of 
Justice Alito. He wrote, “if changing judges changes law, it is not even clear what law is.” 
Posner, supra note 90, at 1. 
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With the few exceptions noted below, this essay does not include 
unpublished opinions.  Because unpublished opinions do not have 
precedential weight except with regard to the doctrine of law of the case 
and claim and issue preclusion,92 their citation is frowned upon.93  For the 
purposes of this essay, they are tallied and analyzed only to demonstrate 
the overall productivity of senior justices.  For example, Justice Powell 
heard 273 cases while on senior status, however, fully 157 (57.5%) of 
those were unpublished.  Comparing Justice Powell’s overall work rate 
without this data against Justice Clark, who heard 404 cases (1.7% of 
which were unpublished), would have been unfair to Justice Powell’s 
service and resulted in incomplete comparative analysis. 
In addition cases vacated en banc94 and panel decisions certifying 
questions to state supreme courts95 were not counted.  Vacated opinions 
are legally void, while certified questions ask state supreme courts to 
clarify the law for a federal court.  However, cases that the Supreme Court 
heard and vacated were counted, as they illustrate the frequency with 
which the justice incorrectly identified and applied the law.96  In essence, 
panel decisions that the Supreme Court vacated are counted as reversals.  
Relatedly, cases superseded by statue97 or overturned or reversed at a much 
later date98 are not counted against a senior justice.  Only direct reversals 
are included.  Court of Claims cases, where the court notes that the other 
panel judges concur, are counted as if the sitting senior justice was in the 
majority, not concurring.  This is because the Court of Claims, as an 
institution, has treated authored opinions in this manner and because no 
separate concurrence appears.99 
The database of cases involving Justices O’Connor and Souter 
contains cases from the time each justice assumed senior status until 
December 31, 2014.  The data on each justice must be accepted with some 
                                                                                                                         
 92 See, e.g., 9TH CIR. R. 36-3(a). 
 93 See, e.g., 4TH CIR. R. 32.1. 
 94 See. e.g., Chapman v. United States, 541 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1976) vacated en banc, 
575 F.2d 147, 151 (7th Cir. 1978) (“We note that the panel decision no longer stands as a 
precedent on the duty issue, because the effect of granting the rehearing in banc was to 
vacate the panel opinions.”). 
 95 See, e.g., Osterweil v. Bartlett, 706 F.3d 139, 140 (2d Cir. 2013) certified question 
accepted, 20 N.Y. 3d 1058 (2013). 
 96 See, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 524 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1975) cert. 
granted, judgment vacated, 425 U.S. 929(1976). 
 97 United States v. Ellis, 951 F.2d 580 (4th Cir. 1991), superseded by statute as stated 
in United States v. Kinter, 235 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 98 See, e.g., Lowe v. Aarco-Am., Inc., 536 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir. 1976) overruled by 
N.A.A.C.P. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1992) and overruled by 
Autry v. Nw. Premium Services, Inc., 144 F.3d 1037 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 99 See, e.g., Heinz v. United States, 312 F.2d 759, 764 (Ct. Cl. 1963). 
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skepticism, as petitions for certiorari and rehearing may be pending.  
Overall, however, the nine and five years of service each justice has 
provided the Circuit Courts, respectively, contain enough cases to form 
the basis for useful analyses and comparisons with each other, with active 
justices of the Supreme Court, with prior senior justices of the Supreme 
Court, with active circuit judges, and with senior circuit judges. 
With few exceptions, the author personally identified and collected 
the data presented. To better compare senior justices with active and senior 
circuit judges, an average or composite active and senior circuit court 
judge was generated.  To do so, the author selected a single active and 
senior judge from each circuit  and tallied the cases he or she heard, as 
well as the opinions, dissent, and concurrences  he or she authored, 
mirroring the process used to generate the data of the senior justices’ 
service on the appellate courts.100  The selection includes circuit judges 
picked from across the ideological spectrum, as determined by their 
appointing president.  Care was taken to pick judges with varying lengths 
of tenure and to ensure that those senior judges chosen were still hearing 
cases.  The cases tallied covered the period from October 1, 2011 to 
September 30, 2012, the same timeframe the Administrative Office of 
United States Courts (AOUSC) uses to organize its data pools.  In addition, 
this essay’s data pool includes unpublished and published opinions, in 
order to present a complete picture of a senior judge’s work, given the high 
percentage of cases that go unpublished today.  In addition, the author 
gathered and tallied senior circuit judges’ total caseloads for this period, 
noting the judges’ position on each panel (i.e. opinion author, majority 
voter, dissenter, etc.)—the same procedure used for senior justices.  This 
procedure was not repeated for active judges, however, because each 
active judge’s dataset over the year in question was too large for a timely 
quantification and analysis.  Finally, where noted, the essays relied on the 
AOUSC’s overall data on the courts. 
B. Data Analyses and Findings 
This section presents the accumulated research data. It analyses the 
number of cases each justice heard, how many opinions, concurrences, and 
                                                                                                                         
 100 The then-active judges selected are Boudin, Pooler, Chagares, Wilkinson, Clement, 
Cole, Wood, Colloton, Tallman, Kelly, Tjoflat, Garland, and O’Malley on the First, 
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, D.C., and 
Federal Circuits respectively. The senior judges are Stahl, Leval, Barry, Hamilton, Wiener, 
Merritt, Ripple, Beam, Hug, Seymour, Cox, Silberman, Clevenger on the First, Second, 
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, D.C., and Federal 
Circuits respectively. Senior Judges Leval, Ripple, Seymour, and Clevenger all sat by 
designation on other circuits. These cases were included in the dataset. 
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dissents each authored, as well as the per curiam opinions produced by 
panels that included a senior justice.  Similar tallies for select active and 
senior judges generated an average active and senior judge for easy 
comparison. Using the data gathered, this section compares the judicial 
service of senior justices with each other, with active Supreme Court 
justices, with active circuit judges, and with senior circuit judges. 
i. Cases Heard 
Justice Clark was the hardest working senior justice in terms of 
number of cases heard.  In his thirteen years, he heard 404 cases.  Justice 
Brennan’s three cases, on the other hand, represent the fewest number of 
cases heard by any senior justice who sat by designation on a Circuit 
Court.  Table 2 and Chart 1 illustrate the disparate number of cases senior 
justices took on during their senior tenures on Circuit Courts.  The table 
and chart include published and unpublished cases to show how each 
justice measures against his or her peers. 
 
Justice Published Opinions 
Unpublished 
Opinions Totals 
Clark 397 7 404 
Powell 116 157 273 
Souter 193 46 239 
Reed 191 0 191 
O’Connor 83 93 176 
White 51 23 74 
Burton 63 0 63 
Stewart 44 0 44 
Marshall 8 2 10 
Brennan 2 1 3 
Totals 1148 329 1477 
 
Table 2: Cases Heard by Senior Justices on Courts of Appeals 
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Chart 1: Published and Unpublished Opinions by Senior Justices on 
Courts of Appeals by Percentage of Their Total Opinions Written 
 
The numbers show first that many justices hear a considerable 
number of cases on senior status.  While Justice Clark’s 404 exceeds the 
others, and amounts to 27.4% of all senior justices’ cases, Justice Powell 
heard a hefty 273 cases, or 18.5% of all senior justices’ cases.  Justice 
Souter has now heard 239 cases, while Justices Reed and O’Connor round 
out the top five, heaving heard 191 and 176 cases, respectively.  The data 
also show the recent rise in unpublished opinions, with the first four senior 
justices together producing seven unpublished opinions in total—all from 
Justice Clark—while justices retiring since 1987 took part in 322 
unpublished opinions. Indeed, unpublished opinions accounted for 1.7% 
of Justice Clark’s cases, 57.5% of Justice Powell’s, 33.3% of Justice 
Brennan’s, 20.0% of Justice Marshall’s docket, 31.1% of Justice White’s, 
52.8% of Justice O’Connor’s, and 19.2% of Justice Souter’s cases.  The 
dramatic rise in unpublished opinions across the judicial system likely 
accounts for its concomitant rise in the number of unpublished opinions 
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senior justices joined and wrote.  Indeed unpublished opinions accounted 
for 81.4% of circuit opinions in 2012.101 
When compared to the number of years each justice heard opinions 
while on senior status, the data show some particularly hard working 
justices.  For example, Justices Clark, Powell, and Souter all averaged over 
forty cases in a year, over half of the 2012 Supreme Court caseload.102  The 
average across the senior justice dataset per year was a manageable 
twenty-two cases, while the median was eighteen cases in a year.  Chart 2 
presents this data. 
 
Chart 2: Cases Senior Justices Hear Per Year 
 
When compared to the seventy-seven argued cases in the Supreme 
Court’s October 2012 Term,103 both the mean (twenty-two) and median 
(eighteen) are around a quarter of the Supreme Court’s current caseload, 
                                                                                                                         
 101 Thomas Hogan, Annual Report of the Director 2012: Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts, Table S-3, available at: http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/tables/S03sep12.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2015). 
 102 Chief Justice John Roberts, 2013 Year End Report, Appendix: Workload of the 
Courts (2014) (“During the 2012 Term, 77 cases were argued and 76 were disposed of in 
73 signed opinions . . . .”). 
 103 Id. 
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as the statute authorizing senior status requires a senior justice reach to be 
eligible for salary increases.104  The data also show that Justices Marshall, 
Stewart, and Reed heard relatively few cases a year, while Justice 
Brennan’s three cases in his single year of service were the likely result of 
his ill-health. 
In comparison, 162 active and 88 senior circuit judges disposed of 
35,095 cases on the merits from October 1, 2011 to September 30, 2012.105  
Circuit judges heard 7115 oral arguments in this same time sitting on an 
average of 56 panels each.106  The composite active judge on average sat 
on forty-eight cases where he wrote an opinion, concurrence, or dissent.107  
Although not a perfect match, because these data do not include all cases 
they heard because the universe of data proved unmanageable, the data 
demonstrate that active judges write in more than double the cases an 
average senior justice hears.  Senior judges, on the other hand, heard, on 
average 145 cases from October 1, 2011 to September 30, 2012.108  This 
dataset, however, is possibly skewed because senior Judge Hamilton heard 
661 cases in this span, although he only wrote in seven of them.109  
Removing him from the dataset, the average senior judge heard 102 cases, 
with Judge Silberman on the D.C. Circuit hearing the fewest at 22.110  This 
shows that senior judges hear far more cases than senior justices, fully 6.5 
and 4.6 times more cases, with and without Judge Hamilton’s total 
number.  The data also demonstrate that senior justices hear far fewer cases 
than active circuit judges.  Chart 3 illustrates the differences. 
                                                                                                                         
 104 See Madden, supra note 5, at 1157 n.79; McElroy & Dorf, supra note 4, at 87 n.25 
 105 Thomas Hogan, Annual Report of the Director 2012: Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts, Statistical Tables – U.S. Courts of Appeals, available at: 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/appendices/B01Sep12
.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2013); Federal Court Management Statistics: September 2012, 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, available at: http://www.uscou
rts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalCourtManagementStatistics/2012/ap
peals-fcms-profiles-september-2012.pdf&page=1 (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).  I spent a 
significant amount of time trying to break down this data further to determine the cases 
heard by senior judges, as well. As first glance it seems like simple mathematical analysis 
to determine this figure from the data tables. However, these attempts were futile, as more 
specific data is needed to break down the percentages of cases heard by senior judges, 
including what the Administrative Office of the United States Courts means when it says 
75.7% of all merits cases were decided by active judges. Id. This is why the essay uses a 
composite active and senior circuit judge. 
 106 Hogan supra note 105; Federal Court Management Statistics, supra note 105. 
 107 See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 682 F.3d 244 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 108 See. e.g., Alpine Glass, Inc., v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 686 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 109 See, e.g., United States v. Dimache, 665 F.3d 603 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 110 See, e.g., Gunderson Lutheran Med. Center, Inc., v. Sebelius, 666 F.3d 1335 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011). 
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Chart 3: Average Cases Heard per Year Compared 
ii. Position on Judicial Panels 
The remainder of the analyses of senior justices’ service does not 
include unpublished opinions.  The remaining portions of this essay focus 
on the impact of the opinions and votes of each justice in senior status.  
Since unpublished opinions do not have precedential weight in the circuits, 
their impact is negligible.  Thus, they are excluded.  The essay includes 
unpublished opinions for the active and senior judges studied for the 
reasons offered earlier and presents the data below in four categories: 
number of opinions authored, times in a panel’s majority, per curiam and 
concurrences, and dissents.  These four categories provide a complete 
picture of each justices’ service and allow for easy comparison. 
a. As Opinion Author 
Although each of the eleven senior justices studied wrote opinions 
for panels, the frequency with which they wrote the opinion for that panel 
varies considerably.  Chart 4 below presents the percentage of cases on 
which the justices authored panel opinions. 
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Chart 4: Percentage Opinions Authored of Cases Heard 
 
The data show that the senior justices authored between 12 and 36 
percent of cases they heard, with Justice Brennan’s 50 percent an outlier 
likely because he heard so few cases.  Justice White was most likely to 
author an opinion as a senior justice, while Justices Marshall and Burton 
were least likely to do so.  On average, senior justices authored opinions 
for 24.1 percent of the cases they heard, while the median was 20.6 
percent.  These data show that Justices Powell and White were most likely 
to write opinions, while both Justices Clark and Reed, despite taking part 
in the most appellate cases, were each less likely than the average senior 
justice to author a panel decision.  By comparison, active Supreme Court 
Justices wrote the majority opinion eight times in the 2012 term, equating 
to 10.26 percent of the time.111  The average senior circuit judge authored 
the panel opinion in 10 percent of the cases he heard, while the median 
was 14 percent.112 
                                                                                                                         
 111 Stat Pack for October Term 2012, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27,2013), 
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/SCOTUSblogStatPackOT1
21.pdf. The average includes per curiam opinions to take into account the entire term’s 
docket. 
 112 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Holder, 673 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2012). As noted earlier, the 
dataset for active judges was too large to make similar comparisons across their year of 
service. 
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Thus, senior justices on average, wrote the panel decision more than 
twice as often as active justices and senior judges, and 1.5 times as often 
as the median senior judge.  Although it is beyond this essay’s scope, 
perhaps the presence of a senior justice on a panel leads to more authored 
opinions, as other judges defer to them.  Their reduced workload may also 
enable senior justices to take on a higher proportion of writing assignments 
for a panel vis-à-vis the number of cases they hear.  Presumably, active 
circuit judges author opinions in one-third of the cases they hear.  If this 
assumption holds, then senior justices are writing fully 9 percent of the 
time less than an active circuit judge. 
In addition to the percentage each justice authored an opinion from 
his or her total service, it is possible to determine how many opinions a 
senior justice authored yearly.  Chart 5 below compares the number of 
opinions each senior justice authored in a single year.  In a given year, 
senior justices, on average, write 3.5 opinions.  As the chart shows, Justice 
Souter is the most prolific, authoring eight opinions per year, which is 
more than double the average.  Justice Marshall was the least prolific, 
having written only one opinion in his sixteen months on senior status.113  
As the chart shows, Justice Clark came in a close second to Justice Souter, 
while Justice Powell, although the third most prolific opinion author, 
wrote two full opinions fewer per year than Justice Clark and four fewer 
than Justice Souter.  Compared to the 2012 Supreme Court term, where 
the average justice wrote eight majority opinions, senior justices average 
just under half that total, while Justice Clark came in just below and Souter 
outperformed the 2012 Court term.114 
Compared to circuit judges, however, senior justices authored far 
fewer majority opinions in a given year.  The AOUSC averaged opinions 
over active circuit judges and found that each wrote 181 opinions last 
year.115  This total includes signed, unsigned, and opinions without 
comment.  If only signed opinions are tallied, which is the only 
comparable data point to this essay’s research of senior justices’ opinions, 
the average is fifty-nine opinions, or nearly seventeen times a senior 
justice.116  The composite active judge wrote thirty-seven majority 
opinions in the 2012 term, while the composite senior judge authored 
fifteen majority opinions, representing 10.6 and four times as many 
majority opinions in a calendar year than a senior justice, respectively.117  
                                                                                                                         
 113 Trans Sport, Inc. v. Starter Sportswear, Inc., 964 F.2d 186, 187 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 114 SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 111. 
 115 Hogan, supra note 105. 
 116 Hogan, supra note 105. 
 117 See, e.g., Bader v. Wrenn, 675 F. 3d 95 (1st Cir. 2012); SEC v. Goble, 682 F.3d 934 
(11th Cir. 2012). 
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On the other hand, Justice Souter’s average puts him just above half the 
composite senior judge’s output, 21.6 percent of the composite an active 
judge, and 13.6 percent of all active judges on the Courts of Appeals. 
 
 
 
Chart 5: Majority Opinions Authored By Senior Justice Per 
Year 
 
Thus, senior justices—despite writing more often for any particular 
panel—still produce far fewer opinions in a given year than an active or 
senior circuit judge.  Although their numbers are not far from those of an 
active Supreme Court Justice, they are significantly lower than that of their 
appellate colleagues.  The discrepancy likely stems from the overall 
caseload differences between senior justices and active and senior circuit 
judges.  Given that the statutory requirement to remain eligible for regular 
wage increases is a quarter of one’s former caseload, senior justices can 
much more easily obtain their mandated casework in a given year, likely 
resulting in the different results observed.  The fact that senior justices are 
likely to write an opinion on a panel may be due to their reduced caseloads 
vis-à-vis other panel members or deference shown by their fellow panel 
members.  The data do not prove either theory is responsible for the results. 
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for certiorari and the subsequent results.  Table 3 shows the number of 
opinions each senior justice wrote, how many were petitioned for certiorari 
and denied, as well as those opinions granted certiorari and affirmed or 
reversed. 
 
 
Table 3: Opinions of Senior Justices and the Supreme Court 
 
The data show that very little of what a senior justice writes reaches 
the Supreme Court, and almost no opinion is reversed.  The Supreme Court 
never reversed or affirmed Justices Stewart, Powell, Brennan, Marshall, 
or White.118  Justices O’Connor and Souter have also yet to face reversal 
or enjoy affirmation, although the Supreme Court has denied certiorari for 
five of Justice O’Connor’s twenty-two and eight of Souter’s forty 
opinions.119  Justice Burton saw one of his opinions granted certiorari and 
affirmed.120  On the other end of the spectrum, fully a third of the opinions 
Justice Reed authored resulted in petitions for certiorari, although only one  
                                                                                                                         
 118 Justices Brennan and Marshall each only wrote a single opinion, so their sample 
sizes are too small for meaningful comparison. 
 119 See, e.g., Mendes v. Brady, 656 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2011) (Souter, J.) cert. denied, 
132 S.Ct. 1551 (2012); United States v. Mateos, 623 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(O’Connor, J.) cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 1540 (2011).  Their unpublished opinions were not 
included in this tally, although one unpublished opinion of Justice Souter’s was denied 
certiorari. United States v. Ayala-Lopez, 493 F. App’x 120 (1st Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct 1459 (2013). 
 120 Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union, 280 F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1960) aff’d, 366 
U.S. 731(1961). 
Justice Opinions Cert. Petitions 
Cert. 
Denied 
Cert. 
Granted Affirmed Reversed 
Clark 72 23 20 3 1 2 
Souter 40 8 8 0 0 0 
Reed 33 11 10 1 0 1 
Powell 32 7 7 0 0 0 
O’Connor 22 5 5 0 0 0 
White 18 5 5 0 0 0 
Stewart 9 1 1 0 0 0 
Burton 8 3 2 1 1 0 
Brennan 1 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Marshall 1 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Totals 236 63 58 5 2 3 
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petition was granted and that opinion vacated.121  And out of the three 
petitions for certiorari that the Supreme Court granted from Justice Clark’s 
thirty opinions, the Court reversed Justice Clark twice and affirmed him 
once..122 
Overall, the data show that senior justices often get the law right, not 
requiring Supreme Court review.  Of the five cases granted certiorari, 
however, the Supreme Court reversed three times, demonstrating that the 
grant of certiorari predicted reversal sixty percent of the time.  This 
percentage corresponds with the Supreme Court’s reversal rate from the 
2011 October Term, which was sixty-three percent, suggesting that senior 
justices are no more or less competent as opinion authors than today’s 
circuit court judges.123  In the 2012 October Term, however, senior justices 
bested circuit judges who were reversed 72 percent of the time.124  
Nonetheless this demonstrates that senior justices do not have any greater 
insight into the Court’s reasoning nor are they better or worse at predicting 
a particular result, although the stories of Justices Clark and Stewart earlier 
discussed show that they can, from time to time, move the Supreme Court 
or get the law “right” on a particular issue. 
b. In the Majority 
Senior justices can also be compared based on the number of times 
their panel is affirmed or reversed, when they are in the majority but did 
not write the opinion.  As would be expected, the data presented below 
show that of the cases appealed to the Supreme Court, few were granted 
certiorari and even fewer were reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
 121 See, e.g., Kehaya v. United States, 355 F.2d 639 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Pub. Affairs Assocs., 
Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1960) vacated, 369 U.S. 111 (1962); Porter v. 
United States, 258 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1958). 
 122 United States v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 534 F.2d 805 (8th Cir. 1976) vacated and 
remanded, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 
1974) aff’d sub nom. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976); Avrech v. Sec’y of Navy, 
477 F.2d 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1973) rev’d, 418 U.S. 676 (1974). 
 123 SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 111, at 3. 
 124 SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 111, at 3. The state supreme court reversal rate was 
removed but the percentage of reversal remains 72. A longitudinal analysis of reversal rates 
of circuit judges since 1937 may shed more light on these results, but such an analysis is 
beyond this essay’s scope. 
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Justice Opinions Cert. Petitions 
Cert. 
Denied 
Cert. 
Granted Affirmed Reversed 
Clark 223 61 56 5 1 4 
Souter 149 30 30 N/A N/A N/A 
Reed 109 22 19 3 1 2 
Powell 67 17 15 2 1 1 
O’Connor 58 14 13 1 0 1 
White 28 8 8 N/A N/A N/A 
Burton 26 6 5 1 1 0 
Stewart 26 8 8 N/A N/A N/A 
Marshall 7 2 2 N/A N/A N/A 
Brennan 1 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Totals 694 168 156 12 4 8 
 
Table 4: Cases with a Senior Justice in the Majority 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 6: Disposition of Cases Appealed to the Supreme Court 
(by Percentage) with a Senior Justice in the Majority 
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The Supreme Court reversed nine percent of appealed panel 
decisions where Justice Reed (2/22)125 was in the majority and seven 
percent of Justice O’Connor’s majority votes (1/14).126  These two senior 
justices experienced the highest reversal rate among senior justices.  Third 
was Justice Clark, whose panel majorities saw four reversals.127  These 
four reversals represent the single most number of reversals, but by the 
percentages they constitute merely 6.5 percent of his sixty-one cases 
appealed to the Supreme Court, which is within reach of Justice Powell’s 
5.9 percent reversal rate, or one128 out of seventeen cases.  All other senior 
justices were fortunate not to have any panels they joined reversed by the 
Supreme Court.  Overall, two-thirds of the cases granted certiorari were 
reversed, corresponding with the 63 percent rate of reversal from the 
October 2011 Supreme Court term and the 72 percent reversal rate for the 
October 2012 term.129  Thus senior justices are no better nor worse than 
circuit judges regarding reversal rates, suggesting that they have no special 
insight into the outcomes of the Supreme Court, despite their prior careers. 
c. Per Curiam Opinions and Concurrences 
Courts use Per curiam, or by the court, opinions when they want to 
speak anonymously or with one voice.  No single judge takes credit for the 
opinion, and no judge’s name is attached to the opinion.  Per curiam 
opinions are used either for controversial cases, like Bush v. Gore,130or 
mundane or routine cases like KPMG v. Cocchi.131 
In all, senior justices sat on panels producing 193 per curiam 
opinions.  Nearly one-quarter (23 percent) of per curiam dispositions were 
                                                                                                                         
 125 Grumman v. United States, 294 F.2d 708 (D.C. Cir. 1961) rev’d, 370 U.S. 288 
(1962); Silber v. United States, 296 F.2d 588 (D.C. Cir. 1961) rev’d, 370 U.S. 717 (1962). 
 126 United States v. Miller, 484 F.3d 964 (8th Cir. 2007) cert. granted, vacated, 552 
U.S. 1089 (2008) 
 127 Briscoe v. Levi, 535 F.2d 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1976) vacated and remanded sub nom. 
Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404 (1977); Piphus v. Carey, 545 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1976) rev’d, 
435 U.S. 247 (1978); United States v. Lovasco, 532 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1976) rev’d, 431 U.S. 
783 (1977); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 524 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1975) cert. 
granted, vacated, 425 U.S. 929 (1976). 
 128 In re Owen, 877 F.2d 44 (11th Cir. 1989) rev’d sub nom. Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 
305(1991). 
 129 SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 111, at 3; SCOSTUSblog, Final Stat Pack October 2011 
Term available at: http://dailywrit.com/blog/uploads/2012/06/SCOTUSblog_Stat_Pack
_OT11_final.pdf. 
 130 531 U.S. 98 (2000) 
 131 132 S.Ct. 23 (per curiam) (remanding to Florida state court for consideration of 
whether arbitration is required for some of the claims alleged). 
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appealed132 to the Supreme Court, but only one opinion was granted 
certiorari, representing a 2.2 percent rate.  That opinion came from a D.C. 
Circuit panel that senior Justice Reed sat on, and the Supreme Court 
affirmed.133 
It is worth noting that many of the unpublished opinions not 
presented here were disposed per curiam, potentially accounting for the 
drop in per curiam opinions from the time of Justice Clark’s senior service 
to Justice Souter’s, with unpublished opinions taking the place of per 
curiam dispositions today. Table 5 below presents the data.  Of note, 
panels featuring either Justice Reed, Burton, or Clark accounted for 84.9 
percent of all published per curiam cases in the dataset. 
 
Justice 
Per 
Curiam 
Opinions 
Cert. 
Petitions 
Cert. 
Denied 
Cert. 
Granted Affirmed Reversed 
Clark 100 21 21 N/A N/A N/A 
Reed 39 10 9 1 1 N/A 
Burton 25 8 8 N/A N/A N/A 
Powell 13 3 3 N/A N/A N/A 
Stewart 7 1 1 N/A N/A N/A 
Souter 4 2 2 N/A N/A N/A 
O’Connor 3 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
White 2 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Brennan 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Marshall 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Totals 193 45 44 1 1 0 
 
Table 5: Total Per Curiam Opinions 
 
Concurrences, on the other hand, were unlikely occurrences 
according to the dataset.  In fact, eight senior justices never concurred.  
Indeed, Justice Burton, one of the three Justices to concur with a panel’s 
decision, did so only once and without opinion.134  Justice Powell wrote 
                                                                                                                         
 132 See, e.g., Harrison v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 890 F.2d 676 (4th Cir. 1989) (per 
curiam) cert. denied Harrison v. Rollins, 495 U.S. 920 (1990); Smith v. Bordenkircher, 671 
F.2d 986 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) cert. denied Smith v. Sowders, 459 U.S. 848 (1982). 
 133 Hutcheson v. United States, 285 F.2d 280 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (per curiam) aff’d, 369 
U.S. 599 (1962). 
 134 Stevan v. Union Trust Company of D.C., 316 F.2d 687, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1963) 
(Burton, J., concurring without opinion). 
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three concurrences during his senior tenure.135  Parties appealed one of 
these three, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.136  Finally, Justice 
White authored two concurrences, one on the Tenth Circuit in 1994,137 
another on the Fifth in 1995.138  In the second case, Justice White 
concurred without opinion.139  The table below shows these data. 
 
Justice Concurrences Cert. Petitions 
Cert. 
Denied 
Cert. 
Granted Affirmed Reversed 
Powell 3 1 1 0 N/A N/A 
White 2 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Burton 1 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Totals 6 1 1 0 N/A N/A 
 
Table 6: Total Concurrences 
 
Senior justices, it seems, are far less likely than active justices today 
to concur.  Indeed active Supreme Court justices concurred on average 
four times in the October 2001 and 2012 terms, as opposed to the near 
negligible numbers found here.140  In addition, the composite active judge 
concurred four times in the period studied and the composite senior judge 
concurred on average more than once in the same period.141  The numbers 
show that both senior justices and judges are far less likely to concur than 
their active counterparts.  Perhaps the varying caseloads of the circuits and 
Supreme Court explain this discrepancy, at least in part.  The Supreme 
Court may have a much more contentious caseload.  Additionally, 
Supreme Court concurrences can later take the place of majority 
opinions—as seen in Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown 
                                                                                                                         
 135 Mickles v. Shalala, 29 F.3d 918, 921 (4th Cir. 1994) (Powell, J., concurring); Hodge 
v. Jones, 31 F.3d 157, 168 (4th Cir. 1994) (Powell, J., concurring) cert. denied 513 U.S. 
1018 (1994); Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 950 (4th Cir. 1988) (Powell, J., 
concurring). 
 136 Hodge, 31 F.3d at 168 (Powell, J., concurring) cert denied 513 U.S. 1018 (1994). 
 137 TBG, Inc. v. Bendis, 36 F.3d 916, 929 (10th Cir. 1994) (White, J., concurring). 
 138 United States v. Maldonado, 42 F.3d 906, 914 (5th Cir. 1995) (White, J., 
concurring). 
 139 Id. 
 140 See Stat Pack for October Term 2012, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27,2013), 
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/SCOTUSblog_StatPack_O
T121.pdf at 8; SCOTUSblog, Final Stat Pack October 2011 Term available at: 
http://dailywrit.com/blog/uploads/2012/06/SCOTUSblog_Stat_Pack_OT11_final.pdf at 7. 
 141 See, e.g.,Tucker v. Las Vegas Met. Police Dept., 470 Fed. Appx. 627, 629 (9th Cir. 
2012) (Tallman, J., concurring); Peak v. Webb, 673 F.3d 465, 474 (6th Cir. 2012) (Merritt, 
J., concurring). 
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Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer142—potentially explaining why active justices 
are likely to concur, although the same rationales do not hold for active 
circuit judges. 
d. In the Minority and/or Dissenting 
Seven of the ten senior justices who served on appellate courts after 
leaving the Supreme Court dissented on lower court panels.  Only Justices 
Brennan, Marshall, and Souter did not.  Given the small number of cases 
Justices Brennan and Marshall heard, this is not unexpected.  Justice 
Souter, however, has yet to author a dissent despite the significant number 
of cases he has heard, thus breaking the pattern.  Still, as the numbers 
show, dissenting is rare. 
 
 
Table 7: Total Dissents per Senior Justice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
 142 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
Justice Dissents Cert. Petitions 
Cert. 
Denied 
Cert. 
Granted Affirmed Reversed 
Reed 10 3 2 1 0 1 
Burton 3 1 1 0 0 0 
Clark 2 1 1 0 0 0 
Stewart 2 2 2 0 0 0 
Powell 1 1 1 0 0 0 
O’Connor 1 0 0 0 0 0 
White 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Brennan 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Marshall 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Souter 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Totals 20 8 7 1 0 1 
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Chart 7: Cases Heard per One Dissent by Senior Justice 
 
Chart 8: Percentage of Dissents per Cases Heard as a Senior 
Justice 
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As Table 7 and Charts 7 and 8 indicate, Justice Reed was the most 
likely senior justice to dissent.  For every nineteen cases he heard, he 
dissented in one.143  In one case, he dissented when a later Court of Claims 
panel overruled an earlier opinion he joined.144  He was also the only senior 
justice to dissent and see his rationales later win in the Supreme Court on 
appeal.145  Justice Clark was the least likely to dissent, publishing two 
dissents over the 397 published opinions he joined or authored, equating 
to a 0.5 percent dissent rate.146  Interestingly, Justice Stewart authored two 
dissents in the same case.  First, he dissented from a panel decision of the 
Seventh Circuit that vacated the trial court and then from the subsequent 
en banc  decision.147  Ultimately the Supreme Court reversed the Circuit, 
three years after Justice Stewart’s original dissent, which the Court cited 
for its correct conclusion that state court judgments do not bar subsequent 
federal antitrust claims.148 
The average senior justice dissented every 72 cases or 1.9 percent of 
the time, while the median length between dissents was 51 published 
decisions or in 1.03 percent of cases.  In the October 2011 term, Supreme 
Court Justices dissented, on average, every 5.67 cases, or 7.5 percent of 
the time,149 while in the October 2012 term, they dissented every 5.9 cases, 
or 7.5 percent of the time.150  Active justices, therefore, were much more 
likely to dissent over the last two terms than the average senior justice over 
his or her senior career.  This result is likely the product of the high stakes 
of Supreme Court jurisprudence as opposed to the appeals of right heard 
on the circuit courts. 
In addition, the composite active circuit judge dissented 5.5 times, 
while the composite senior judge did so 1.5 times in the period studied, 
                                                                                                                         
 143 See, e.g., Carson v. United States, 317 F.2d 370, 379 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (Reed, J., 
dissenting); Brewster v. U.S., 255 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (Reed, J., dissenting). 
 144 Hynning v. United States, 141 Ct. Cl. 486, 494 (1958) overruled in part by Zeiger 
v. United States, 295 F.2d 915, 917 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (Reed, J., dissenting). 
 145 Midwestern Gas Transmission Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 258 F.2d 660, 670 (D.C. 
Cir. 1958) vacated sub nom. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Midwestern Gas Transmission Co., 
358 U.S. 280, 79 S. Ct. 316, 3 L. Ed. 2d 299 (1959). 
 146 United States v. Williams, 561 F.2d 859, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Clark, J., dissenting); 
Mayer Paving & Asphalt Co. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 486 F.2d 763, 772 (7th Cir. 1973) 
(Clark, J., dissenting) cert denied 414 U.S. 1146 (1974). 
 147 Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 692 F.2d 1083, 1096 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(Stewart, J., dissenting) vacated, 706 F.2d 1488, 1499 (7th Cir. 1983) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting) on reh’g, 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1984) rev’d, 470 U.S. 373, 105 S. Ct. 1327, 
84 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1985). 
 148 Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 383 (1985). 
 149 See SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 129, at 7. 
 150 See SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 111, at 7. 
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amounting to just over 1 percent of the time, or once every 99 cases.151  
Thus senior judges are even less likely to dissent than senior justices.  
Given that many of the senior justices sat on different circuits, perhaps 
they were more comfortable dissenting from their colleagues, as opposed 
to the senior judges, who, for the most part, heard cases only in their own 
circuits.  Or, perhaps senior justices are trying to get the Supreme Court’s 
attention to grant certiorari or protect areas of the law they have a 
particularly high stake in from their active tenures.  Definite answers 
require more research beyond this essay’s scope. 
IV. EXPLANATIONS 
A. Results and Reality 
The analyses presented in Part III, disprove the hypotheses presented 
in Part II.  No overarching theory explains the results.  While the dataset 
and its analyses paint a vivid picture of the careers of the senior justices, 
only modest and partial explanations attend particular findings and results.  
Building upon the data presented, this section first compares the careers of 
senior justices.  Then it offers some observations and interpretations of the 
tenures of senior justices vis-à-vis active justices, active circuit judges, and 
senior circuit judges. 
Indeed, the data demonstrate that senior justices perform similarly to 
active and senior circuit court judges.  The only significant exception 
being that senior justices are more likely to author a panel opinion than 
senior circuit judges.  But senior justices are not afforded extra deference, 
as measured by percentage as opinion author and dissent rates, among 
other data points.  Nor do senior justices have any “extra insight” into the 
Supreme Court, with a comparable reversal rate to circuit judges.  With 
the exception of Justice Clark’s famous circuit split anecdote and the 
Supreme Court’s affirmance of his legal interpretation, senior justices do 
not seem to have any special insight.  Indeed, just as Justice Clark’s 
anecdote illustrates special pull, Justice Stewart’s double dissent suggests 
the opposite. 
These findings do not diminish the importance of the gathered data.  
Future scholars and researchers may find patterns or have insights 
enabling them to mine more information from these raw results.  
Nevertheless, the comparisons offered below show shed light on the 
                                                                                                                         
 151 See, e.g., Overstreet v. Wilson, 686 F.3d 404, 410 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, J., 
dissenting); Milligan v. Brd. Of Trustees of Southern Ill. U., 686 F.3d 378, 390 (7th Cir. 
2012) (Ripple, J., dissenting). 
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important careers of senior Supreme Court justices and mark the first 
attempt to do so. 
B. Senior Justices Compared 
Senior justices have varied careers.  Since senior status became 
available to Supreme Court justices, some, like Justices Powell and Souter, 
returned to their hometowns, while others, like Justices Clark and 
O’Connor have crisscrossed the nation to sit on appellate court panels.  
Some justices had short senior careers, like Justices Brennan and Marshall, 
while others served for many years, like Justices Reed and Clark. 
Justice Clark heard the most cases as a senior justice.  Justice Souter, 
who has only been a senior justice since 2009, has already heard 239 cases, 
and may one day overtake Justice Clark’s records, given his forty-eight 
case a year pace.152  The data show that Justices Souter, Stewart, and 
Powell, in descending order, heard the most cases a year, doubling the 
average among senior justices.  These three also wrote the most opinions 
per year of senior service.  Justice White was the most likely to author an 
opinion while sitting on a lower court, writing in 35 percent of the cases 
he heard and besting the approximate average of 24 percent.  While only 
three justices concurred in panel decisions during their senior tenure, all 
but three senior justices dissented, with Justice Reed being the most likely 
to so. 
Variety and uniqueness describe these senior justices’ service, as 
measured by performance, location, and longevity.  Overall, senior 
justices have careers as varied as the individuals themselves with each 
molding his or her senior career to fit his or her circumstances. 
C. Senior Justices and Others 
When compared senior justices against active justices, active circuit 
judges, and senior circuit judges, a complex image emerges.  Although 
further scholarly inquiry will be necessary to determine the underlying 
causes of these many differences, this essay will offer initial thoughts and 
conclusions to account for the presented results. 
                                                                                                                         
 152 Perhaps the reduced workload, or being in his native New Hampshire, has removed 
the sting of his Supreme Court experience, whose terms he described as “sort of an annual 
intellectual lobotomy.” Linda Greenhouse, David H. Souter: Justice Unbound, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 2, 2009, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/03/weekinreview/03gree
nhouse.html?adxnnl=1&ref=davidhsouter&adxnnlx=1368030753-1hs+G5ZKxU4sN5y
nnaeiqA (last visited May 8, 2013). 
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i. Senior Justices and Active Justices 
Senior justices heard about a quarter of the cases per year active 
justices hear today.  This is in line with the statutory requirements.  Senior 
justices authored opinions nearly a quarter of the time they heard a case, 
more than doubling the active percentage.  However, senior justices 
authored only 3.46 cases a year, less than half the average for an active 
Supreme Court justice.  Senior justices also were far less likely to concur 
than today’s Supreme Court justices, and they dissented much less often 
than the nine current Supreme Court justices.  Senior justices almost never 
concurred, while the average active justice concurred just over four times 
in the Court’s last two terms alone.  On average, senior justices dissented 
1.9% of the time, while active Supreme Court justices dissented in 7.5% 
of the cases they heard in the October 2012 term.  This difference is most 
likely a product of the distinctive docket of the Supreme Court, which is 
mostly discretionary, and the higher societal and jurisprudential stakes of 
the Supreme Court. 153  Senior justices also may simply have less skin in 
the game. 
Given that senior justices hear a quarter of the cases the active 
justices do, at first glance their much higher percentage as opinion author 
seems noteworthy and may be significant.  However, senior justices sit on 
panels of three, while their active counterparts must divide their cases 
among nine colleagues.  This difference likely accounts for the 
proportional variation of opinion writing.  The fact that senior justices are 
far less likely to dissent or concur is an interesting finding.  It may partly 
be explained by the fact that the cases they hear are less controversial than 
those that reach the Supreme Court with fewer legal consequences on the 
line.  Therefore dissents and concurrences are less important.  Further 
research is necessary, however, to validate this hypothesis. 
ii. Senior Justices and Active Circuit Judges 
As compared to senior justices, active circuit judges wrote ten times 
as many majority opinions in a year.  Active circuit judges also concurred 
more often, writing four concurrences in 2012, compared to the negligible 
number of concurrences senior justices authored.  Senior justices dissented 
once every seventy-three cases or 1.9% of the time, compared to the 5.5 
dissents active circuit judges wrote during the study period.  Given that the 
average senior justice heard twenty-two cases and dissented once every 
seventy-three cases, each would dissent fewer than once every three years.  
                                                                                                                         
 153 Posner, supra note 90, at 8 (“[T]he Supreme Court . . . is largely a political court 
when it is deciding constitutional cases.”); Posner, supra note 90  at 205-06 (describing the 
discretionary docket of the Supreme Court versus the Circuit Courts). 
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Thus, across all measures, senior justices author far fewer opinions, 
concurrences, or dissents than active circuit judges.  This result is to be 
expected, given that active judges hear far more cases than senior justices. 
Active judges are also more likely to write a panel opinion than a 
senior justice.  Senior justices write opinions 24 percent of the time, while 
active circuit judges presumably write 33 percent on a panel of three.  This 
last conclusion, however, rests on the assumption that active circuit judges 
write one-third of panel opinions.  As the data show, senior judges 
certainly do not write in one-third of the cases they hear, so the assumption 
should be viewed with some skepticism.  Further research into the precise 
proportion of opinions any active circuit judge authors per case heard is 
needed to determine this finding’s importance. 
The fact that senior justices author fewer dissents than active circuit 
judges seems to partially prove the first hypothesis, that their position 
commands respect and so they are followed more often on any given panel.  
However, they also author fewer opinions than active circuit judges, 
precisely the opposite result than expected.  Thus the predicted results 
proved only partially true, suggesting other factors account for the data. 
Interestingly, senior justices do mirror active circuit judges when it 
comes to interpreting the law correctly, as measured by the number of 
times the Supreme Court overturned a panel.  Overall, senior justices were, 
on average, slightly less likely to be reversed by the Supreme Court than 
current appellate judges, either as authors or members of a panel majority. 
Current Courts of Appeals are reversed 72 percent of the time when 
certiorari is granted, while senior justices were reversed 60 percent of the 
time as opinion authors and 66 percent of the time as members of a panel’s 
majority.  Thus, as compared across this dataset, against active circuit 
judges, senior justices equal or slightly outperform active circuit judges. 
These data demonstrates that former justices have little if any special 
insight into the workings of the Supreme Court, nor are they more likely 
to predict how the Court may rule on a case than active appellate judges.  
Changing Court dynamics—one justice’s assumption of senior status does 
introduce a new active justice to the bench—may account for this result.  
Thus, despite the differences in caseload and written material, senior 
justices come out on par with their active circuit judge colleagues. This 
finding invalidates the second hypothesis that senior justices would have 
some special insight into the Court’s operations, reasoning, or interests and 
thus have a lower reversal rate than judges lacking their high court 
experience. 
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iii. Senior Justices and Senior Circuit Judges 
Senior circuit judges offer good comparisons for senior justices.  
Senior circuit judges heard, on average, 145 cases.  They authored the 
opinion of their panels fifteen times in 2012 or in 10 percent of the cases 
they heard.  Senior judges also concurred only once a year, coming far 
closer to the senior justice tally.  Senior judges dissented 1.5 times in the 
period studied or in just over 1% (1/99) of the cases they heard.  This result 
is comparable to senior justices who dissented 1.9% (1/73) of time, or once 
every three years.  This represents a proportional difference but perhaps a 
statistically insignificant one.  Senior justices only best senior judges in 
their average of being any panel’s majority writer, writing a quarter of the 
time to senior judges’ average of one in every ten cases. 
Intuitively, these parallels make sense.  Senior judges have reduced 
workloads, like senior justices.  And because senior judges also must 
perform a quarter of their old judicial work, and have a much higher 
baseline of cases compared to senior justices, this likely explains the 
differences in opinions written and percentages as author.  Overall, 
therefore, senior justices resemble their senior circuit judge counterparts 
across a range of variables, disproving the second hypothesis. 
CONCLUSION 
At the outset of this project, it seemed that senior justices would have 
an outsized impact on the federal judiciary, as measured through their 
service on the circuit courts.  Given their former positions, one expects 
their insight to be special, their savvy to produce unique results regarding 
reversals or certiorari, or  their opinion and dissent writing to be active.  
These expectations were unmet. Instead, the research has generated many 
more questions to be answered. 
Nevertheless, this study has made the following findings and 
interpretations and calls for further study and analysis on each point. 
First, senior justices seem to make an outsized impact only with 
regards to opinion writing.  They author opinions at a far higher proportion 
than active justices or senior circuit judges.  Their increased proportions 
vis-à-vis active justices is likely because senior justices participate on 
three-judge panels, not a full bench of nine justices, where opinions are 
divided roughly equally.  Their results compared with senior circuit judges 
may be a product of their reduced workloads or presence on the panel, as 
they hear fewer cases and can presumably write more often when they are 
on a panel, and their prior position as an active justice may generate 
deference from the other panel members.  However, this finding does not 
hold true vis-à-vis active circuit judges.  Thus, deference alone does not 
explain this finding. 
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Second, senior justices hear far fewer cases than active justices, 
active circuit judges, and senior circuit judges.  The varying caseloads of 
each group likely explain this result.  Senior justices need only fulfill a 25 
percent judicial workload requirement to remain eligible for Article III pay 
increases.  And reaching that number—with today’s small Supreme Court 
docket—is not difficult.  Further inquiry is needed to determine the extent 
to which senior justices contemplate their statutory requirements when 
deciding whether to sit by designation on a given circuit panel. 
Third, senior justices are overruled at the same rate as circuit judges.  
This result surprised the author the most.  Senior justices should be adept 
at avoiding reversal.  Further research may wish to inquire whether senior 
justices lose their ability to predict the Court’s outcomes overtime, or to 
what extent shifts in Court personnel impact the chances of being reversed.  
Nevertheless, senior justices are not endowed with special abilities after 
leaving the high court. 
Fourth, senior justices rarely concur, but neither do senior circuit 
judges. This result presents a conundrum.  Perhaps senior justices and 
judges disdain concurring for personal reasons.  Perhaps concurring on a 
lower level offers less impact than doing so on the Supreme Court.  Indeed, 
concurrences on the Supreme Court often have long-lasting consequences, 
such as Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown.154  Additional 
research into the different results vis-à-vis active circuit judges is 
necessary to explain the discovered disparity in concurrences and 
determine the likelihood of concurring for any single active judge to offer 
a more complete comparison. 
Fifth, senior justices dissent less than active justices but more than 
senior circuit judges.  As with concurrences, it seems likely that the 
Supreme Court’s higher stakes and discretionary docket make dissenting 
more attractive to any single justice than the standard appeals by right 
senior justices hear.155  Of note, however, senior justices are more willing 
to dissent than senior judges, as a proportion of the cases they hear.  One 
explanation is that senior justices travel the country hearing cases more 
often than senior circuit judges and thus are more willing to dissent 
because they may not face repercussions over time for their dissents.156  
                                                                                                                         
 154 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 155 Edwards, supra note 77, at 1644 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s docket consists of many 
more ‘very hard’ cases than do those of lower appellate courts. The majority of the cases 
in the circuit courts admit of a right or a best answer and do not require the exercise of 
discretion.”); Posner, supra note 90, at 205-06. 
 156 Contra Edwards, supra note 77, at 1647 (“Unfamiliar group members . . . are likely 
to be concern with social acceptance within the group. This leads to a tendency to conform: 
unfamiliar group members are apprehensive about how they will be evaluated, which leads 
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Alternatively, they may seek to signal to the Supreme Court that a 
significant issue exists, as Justice Clark did in a similar vein when he 
generated a circuit split.  Additional study on this point could yield 
significant details into the careers of senior justices and their decision-
making processes, and shed more light on my first hypothesis, which was 
seemingly disproved. 
Senior justices’ service differs from that of active justices, active 
circuit judges, and senior circuit judges in several respects.  The data 
present numerous questions, and the comparisons offered here represent a 
starting point in understanding senior justices’ careers.  The varying 
conclusions presented throughout this essay and summarized here require 
further study to determine if invisible rationales or confounding variables 
are affecting the interpretations offered.  The hypotheses offered seem 
poorly supported and thus disproved.  It is for future authors and scholars 
to debate the interpretations presented herein and find other correlations.  
Hopefully this essay spurs further interest and examination into the careers 
of senior justices of the United States Supreme Court as they don their robs 
and continue to hear and dispose of cases across the thirteen Courts of 
Appeals of the United States. 
 
                                                                                                                         
them to suppress alternative perspectives and judgments and to behave like other group 
members, regardless of the nature of their private beliefs.”) (internal citation omitted). 
